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		<title>Pclntab on Martin&#39;s Blog</title>
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		<description>Recent content in Pclntab on Martin&#39;s Blog</description>
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				<title>Analyzing internal Go structures in obfuscated binaries</title>
				<link>https://mac.sploit.dk/blog/go-binaries-that-hide-from-gos-own-tools/</link>
				<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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				<description>&lt;p&gt;I have been building a small C tool that fingerprints Go binaries (version, build&#xA;metadata, function names, the lot) and pointing it at a corpus of malware samples.&#xA;A few of them confused an early, naïve version of it: the detector keyed on the&#xA;&lt;code&gt;pclntab&lt;/code&gt; magic number, and these samples did not have the magic it expected. The&#xA;obvious next question is whether they are Go at all, and if so, how much they are&#xA;trying to hide. The answer turned out to have two layers, and only one of them&#xA;does what its author probably hoped.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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