<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security Engineering on Martin's Blog</title><link>https://mac.sploit.dk/categories/security-engineering/</link><description>Recent content in Security Engineering on Martin's Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 21:20:00 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://mac.sploit.dk/categories/security-engineering/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>A Safer Wrapper Is Not a Modernisation Strategy</title><link>https://mac.sploit.dk/blog/a-safer-wrapper-is-not-a-modernisation-strategy/</link><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://mac.sploit.dk/blog/a-safer-wrapper-is-not-a-modernisation-strategy/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Moving a legacy product to a modern operating system is useful engineering. It&#10;can deliver a maintained kernel, current libraries, better compiler defaults,&#10;ASLR, mandatory access control, namespaces, cgroups and service supervision.&#10;All of those can make exploitation harder or contain a failure.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;It can also leave the product&amp;rsquo;s old trust model almost entirely intact.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;The new kernel may still launch the same privileged packet engine, the same&#10;configuration daemon, the same PHP application and the same Perl and shell&#10;helpers. A process running as root retains broad authority unless capabilities,&#10;namespaces or mandatory policy materially constrain it. A shell command built&#10;from attacker-controlled text remains a shell command. A parser written in C&#10;remains memory unsafe even when systemd starts it.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;The wrapper buys time and lowers some risks. It does not retire the engineering&#10;debt inside it.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>